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ABSTRACT 
The National Space Transportation 
Policy "establishes national policy, 
guidelines, and Implementing 
actions for the conduct of National 
space transportation programs that 
will sustain and revitalize U.S. space 
transportation capabilities .•• ". The 
direction to the National 
Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) is to 
"provide for the improvement of 
the Space Shuttle system focusing 
on rellablllty, safety, and cost 
effectiveness." as well as "be the 
lead agency for technology 
development and demonstration 
for next generation reusable space 
transportation systems, such as 
the single-stage-to-orbit concept." 
With this vision, NASA has Initiated 
Cooperative Agreement Notices 
between NASA and the private 
sector for X-33 (Reusable Launch 
Vehicle-Advanced Technology 
Demonstrator) and X-34 (Reusable 
Launch Vehicle-Small Reusable 
Booster) which would provide 
Insight to a decision by December 
1996 to proceed with sub-scale 
flight demonstration to prove the 
single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) 
concept. This paper deals with 
operational Issues which must be 
dealt with In order to achieve SSTO 
goals of reliable low cost space 
transportation and order of 
magnitude reductions in operating 
costs. 
Center Center 
VISION 
Reliable and affordable access to space 
is the stated goal of future space 
transportation vehicles. From an 
operational perspective, we believe that 
this goal can be achieved qnly when 
system operational functloris drive 
vehicle design. Research should be 
focused on those areas which minimize 
the number of subsystems & fluids used, 
the total parts count, and the amount of 
testing required to valic;late system 
integrity. · 
'In the development of the Reusable 
Launch Vehicle (RLV) a joint 
Government/Industry Operations 
Synergy Team (OST) was commissioned 
to ensure that lessons learned from 
prevlOus space transportation programs 
were applied to RL V. The OST has 
developed a vision concept which Is 
directly applicable to RLV and any next 
generation space transportation vehicle. 
This vision concept is based on the 
findings of the Access To Space 
Advanced Technology Team (Option 3)1 
and the vast experience base from 
previous programs. The Advanced 
Technology Team findings are contained 
in four basic requirements: 
Define the mission narrowly to 
transportation only. 
Apply modem advanced technology 
to design a simple vehicle with less 
complex subsystems and fewer 
elements. 
Avoid flight-to-flight certification 
through a prototype development and 
flight test program. 
Adopt a management philosophy that 
empowers individuals to make 
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decisions at the lowest possible level 
replacing today's committee and 
duplicative review process. 
Building on this, the OST developed an 
RLV Operations Concept "Vlsion" which 
comprised ten goals focused on 
operational improvements which are 
geared towards mlnlmlzJng ground test 
time and resource dependence while 
maximlzJng vehfde self-diagnosis, 
dependability and mirVnl.m servicing 
requirements2: 
Provide a simplified, ~ 
automated vehicle enabling 
minimum periodic and repetitive 
maintenance (aircraft-like) and 
resultant short turnaround time 
between missions (hours, not 
months). 
Strive to isolate vehide ground 
processing from dependence on 
facilities and GSE. Routine, 
scheduled turnaround should 
replenish consumables only_ 
Promote vehlcle health 
monitoring/management systems 
and self-test at a level which supplies 
only operations and maintenance 
(O&M) anomaly related Information 
that requires corrective action prior to 
next flight. Let the vehicle •talk" to the 
ground remotely for processing and 
maintenance needs. Incorporate 
special vehicle engineering 
instrumentation only on specifically 
assigned technology demonstration 
vehides (i.e. X-33). 
Elmnate "flight readiness-style• 
vehicle certification for every flight. 
Provide alrcraftMstyle vehlcle-type 
certificate for repetitive oommerdal 
flight operations. 
Design-In performance margins 
and flight hardware allowances to 
eliminate proceHlng Impact, i.e., 
strive to elimlnats unplanned work. 
Mission design and flight operations 
are ~ autonomous by 
design. No dedicated software 
maintenance function is required to 
support operations. 
Reduce operations and hardware 
complexity for maximum utilization of 
resources and reduce opportunity for 
human-induced system failures: Less 
Mhands-on", less human factor. 
Employ near ~ ground 
management planning at top levels. 
Focus on automatic Interactive 
schedullng of flight vehicle, ground 
support facilities, and support 
logistics. 
Adapt minimum standardized 
payload Interfaces to assure 
maxirum flexibility and affordability. 
The most affordable vehicle will be 
blind to payload needs; like a truck, 
not a hospital life support system. 
Eimilate payload Impact on the 
launch vehicle system infrastructure. 
Ensure joint participation Nil 
application of the synergism available 
between Operations, Avionics, 
Propulsion, Payloads, and Vehicle 
Design to the preliminary 
archltecturelvehicle concept, and 
operations development process {i.e. 
Integrated Product Tea'Tl - IPT). This 
entails Identification of 
technologlH that can enable 
development of a vehicle system 
meeting attributes of the National 
Space Transportation Polley'. 
The role of engineering (concept, 
development. and technology) during 
the operatlonal era will be to 
perfonn continuous Improvement 
and technology advancement for 
future market driven needs 
(retain X-33 capability). 
The goal of driving the total 
transportation system design rather than 
reacting to the vehide design shoukt 
result In the realization of overaH 
economic goals associated with future 
space transportation systems. We are 
losing today's market as international 
competition continues to drtve reduced 
cost of annual mass to orbit. Vehide 
sizing should be optimized around 
identified POTENTIAL. pa)ioad user 
requirements and not focused on a 
single user's needs. In order to promote 
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domestic launch opportunities (market 
growth) we must rethink our current 
mind set and approaches to vehicle 
certification which are currently 
measured in months rather than hours. 
During the course of the Commercial 
Space Transport Study (CSTS) the 
industry alliance recognized that aEarty 
identification and definition of system 
attributes and requirements is essential 
to ensuring the transportation system 
meets the user's needs."". Table 1, 
Common CSTS Attributes, is an 
overview of identified attributes which 
must be found in the next generation 
launch system as identified in CSTS Final 
Report in order for the system to be both 
operationally & economically feasible. 
Table 1 - Common CSTS Attributes 
Catenorv 
Dependability 
Schedule 
Reliability 
Cost 
Operations 
Capabilities 
Availability 
Responsiveness 
Attribute 
High probability of 
Launching on 
Schedule 
Minimum Advanced 
Bookino Time 
>Current Systems 
Minimum Cost Per 
Launch 
Standardized and 
Simplified Payload 
Interfaces 
Support Multiple 
Payload Classes 
Provide Deliv"ery 
to Multiple 
Destinations 
Provide On-Ortll 
Rendezvous and 
Docking 
Capabilities 
Provide Delivery 
and Return 
Ca nab ii Wes 
High Probability 
System Will Be In An 
Operational Rather 
Than a Standdown 
State 
Minimum Respoll5e 
Time for Launching On 
Noed 
SHUTTLE EVOLUTION 
During the Apollo Lunar Exploration 
Program it became apparent that the next 
step was a trip to Mars. ln order to go to 
Mars, man needed to gain a thorough 
understanding of living in space for 
longer duration's than a moon flight. A 
manned space station in earth orbit 
seemed to be the answer; however, the 
cost of access to space in support of a 
space station was not supported by 
NASA's projected annual budget. The 
solution was an inlefim space station, 
Skylab, and the development of a 
reusable space transportation system, 
the Space Shuttle. · · · 
The economic plan used to develop the 
operations scenario for the shuttle was 
a five orbiter fleet with a projected flight 
rate of forty flights per year from the 
John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) 
and an additional twenty flights per year 
from Vandenberg Air Force Base 
(VAFB). Early analyses confinned that 
forty flights from KSC could only be 
achieved if vehicle ground turnaround 
could be completed within 160 hours, 
hence the 160 hour turnaround 
allocation. The 160 hour allocation 
processing timeline included initial 
operations and sating, orbiter test 
operations, post flight trouble-shooting, 
Space Shuttle Main Engine/Main 
Propulsion System (SSMEJMPS) 
operations, cargo operations, Thermal 
Protection System (TPS) maintenance & 
repair, maintenance & servicing, element 
integration, fluid servicing and 
countdown. Allocations were also 
developed for facility maintenance and 
turnaround. These timelines were 
accepted and used as PrOgram 
requirements/goals and assessments of 
the allocated timelines were perfonned. 
The process used to focus 
improvements at the launch site and to 
provide visibility to the shuttle program 
manager was the Shuttle Turnaround 
and Analysis Report (STAR). This report 
was updated on a quarterly basis by the 
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(STAG). 
The goal of operational efficiency was 
visualized in concept development of the 
shuttle and the STAR. This is illustrated 
in Figure 1, Artist Concept - Shuttle 
Mating With Payload. 
Figure 1 Artist Concept - Shuttle Mating 
With Payload 
This concept, dated April 8 '74, stressed 
the use of mobile platfonns to gain 
access to the crew compartment and 
payload bay areas for reconfiguration of 
the vehicle. Additionally, the original 
shuttle concepts recognized the benefits 
of reduced recurring costs. This can be 
seen in the limited number of personnel 
supporting ground turnaround operations 
in the orbiter processing facility (OPF). 
The space shuttle transportation 
economics was detennined using an 
operations scenario that was based on 
previously mentioned allocation timelines. 
Assessments of the design highlighted 
incompatibilities with the allocation 
timelines which required system 
modifications. However, because 1) 
non-recurring cost, 2) Design, 
Development, Test, and Evaluation 
(DDT&E) schedule, and 3) weight 
pei"lalties were a higher priority than 
long-tenn operationa; benefits, most 
recommendations for a more supportive 
design were not adopted. Therefore, 
supporting the design was not 
compatible with allocated timelin~. or 
reaching the mission cost goal of $15 
million/flight. 
In order for a space transportation 
architecture to be affordable, vehicle 
design architecture must be driven by 
operations functions so that operations 
requirements are well understood before 
the concept is frozen. This will allow a 
complete understanding of operational 
requirements/economics which are 
required to provide program affordability. 
In the case of the shuttle, the operations 
concept was frozen before operational 
requirements/economics were 
understood and compromises to the 
concept were pennitted well into the 
production phase in order to 1) try to 
reach system performance goals, 2) 
reduce vehicle weight, and 3) reduce 
development cost through utilization of 
old technologies from previous programs 
to minimize development risk in schedule 
and hardware. Each of these 
compromises resulted in changes to 
flight and ground hardware as well as 
the shuttle operations concept. In order 
for RLV to achieve its stated goals, 
similar compromises must be eliminated. 
If in the case of RLV, operational 
compromises are allowed, one might 
expect that the outcome would be similar 
to that illustrated in Figure 2, Shuttle 
Orbiter Columbia In Workstand. 
Since 1979 five vehicles have been 
processed through launch facilities at 
KSC. In that time the average turnaround 
time for vehicle processing through the 
OPF has been approximately sixty days 
(3 shifts/day), five days through the 
Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) (3 
shifts/day), and twenty-two days at the 
launch pad (3 shifts/day). Due to the 
complexity of the vehicle and 
connections to ground support 
equipment, multiple vehicle service 
umbilicals are required. Connection and 
verification between the vehicle and the 
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Figure 2 - Shuttle Orbiter Columbia In 
Workstand 
corresponding facility to insure safety of 
personnel, facilities, and equipmenl 
Eadl of these vehicle service umbilicals 
provide some combination of fluids, 
gases, ground power, and data to the 
vehicle enabling ground test capabilities, 
safing, operations and servicing. 
These vehicle service umbilical 
connections are connected immediatety 
after landing at either Edwards Air Force 
Base (EAFB) or KSC. A set of dedicated 
vehicle service umbilicals are connected 
at each ground station as the elements 
are processed through the respective 
facilities (i.e. Shuttle Landing Facility, 
Orbiter Processing Facility, Vehicle 
Assembly Building, Launch Pad, etc.). 
Eadl time an element is moved between 
ground stations, the vehicle service 
umbilical must be disconnected from one 
facility and reconnected at the next. n 
addition, system integrity must be 
verified at each facility before any 
processing operations can take place. 
1he vehicle is dependent on these 
vehicle service umbilicals until T-31 
seconds at which time the vehicle is 
operating on internal power controlled 
by on-board computers. This support 
the design ap·proach drove a large 
ground infrastructure resulting in high 
recurring costs and lengthly processing 
times measured in months rather than 
hours. 
In other words, this vehicle is highly 
dependent on ground connections and 
support services to perfonn ground 
procedures. The vast majority of these 
test procedures are required servicing, 
irrespective of scheduled maintenance 
or in-flight fallures. As stated earlier, 
future space transportation systems 
should strive to isolate vehicle ground 
processing from dependence on 
facilities and GSE. By adopting th1s, the 
cost of recurring operations will be 
significantly reduced thereby achieving 
the stated goal of reliable and affordable 
access to space. 
EVOLUTIONARY CONCEPTS 
Since 1984 the government has 
investigated numerous concepts for the 
development of a replacement to the 
shuttle. Each of these concepts 
focused on the vehicle only and did not 
address the entire flight and ground 
systems. Major emphasis was placed 
on the reduction of flight element 
production costs and retained the 
support the design approach, starting 
with the rocket engines, then the vehicle, 
and then the ground facilities and 
support equipment required. It was 
recognized that operations experience 
was needed to evolve to a more 
operable approach for the future. 
However, due to priorities at the launch 
operations center, personnel with 
hands-on experience were not actively 
involved in these advanced study 
efforts. In many cases the concept was 
targeted to replace shuttle; however, 
there was no definitive plan to bridge the 
gap from shuttle until the new program 
was certified as operational. 
Additionally, the lack of definition of a 
mission mcx:lel in many cases led to the 
premature termination of each effort. 
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The following is a brief overview of with existing shutUe infrastructure 
some of these concepts: and offered a heavy-lift capability (up 
to 150K lbs. to low earth orbit) within 
The Space Transportation a four year window. In the spring of 
Architecture Study (STAS) 1989 a Shuttle-C Users Conference 
recognized the need for an affordable was sponsored at Huntsville, 
space transportation system capable Alabama to enlighten the user 
of adlieving lower life-cycle costs community of system capabilities and 
with simplified and streamlined detennine a preliminary mission model. 
operations. STAS focused it's efforts The then Space Station Freedom was 
in five areas: (1) logistics support targeted at that time as a potential 
systems (ground & space), (2) user in the space station assembly 
spacecraft modularization, (3) launch sequence and the logistics resupply 
vehicle & orbit transfer systems, (4) missions. Due to sharing the 
technology assessment & development costs, the space station 
development programs, and (5) community was not ready to c:ommil 
mission control systems. Eadl of to using the Shuttle-C. The message 
these areas drove architecture from other potential users was ·build 
synthesis and systems development it and we will come·; however, no 
INhile STAS attempted to drive system one was willing to step up and commi 
design, the evolutionary architecture to Shuttle-C. With no clear definition 
approach encompassed as many as of annual utilization the program was 
four different architectures over a ultimately terminated. 
fifteen year period while each one The National Launch System 
addressed upwards of four vehides. (NLS) consisted of three vehicle 
The operations concept for each of configurations (1 ) a two stage 
these candidate architectures was heavy-lift launch vehicle (HLLV) 
complex and neither user friendly nor capable of delivering 135K lbs. to low 
operationally efficient. earth orbit -- NLS1 , (2) a 1.5 stage 
The Advanced Launch System vehicle capable of delivering 50 K lbs. 
(ALS) architecture allocated a goal to low earth orbit -- NLS2, and (3) a 
for cost to orbit. Unike STAS which single stage vehicle capable of 
was a combination of reusable CWld delivering 20K lbs. to low earth orbit --
expendable vehicles, the ALS NLS3. NLS1 and NLS2 utilized a 
architecture was comprised of common core and a corrmon 
expendable vehicles. ALS stressed propulsion module. NLS2 and NLS3 
high reliability, robustness, flexibility utilized a common upper stage. NL.S 
and cost. The ALS technology was a design to cost approach based 
demonstration program was focused on allocated cost targets. NLS cost 
on reducing system complexity white models used cost estimating 
significantly reducing program cost. relationships (CER's) which had been 
With ALS being a DoD effort CWld in use for years. The lesson learned 
Shuttle-C being a NASA effort in NLS was, in order for true cost 
congesstonal support was limited. savings to be realized, these CER's 
One program was ac.ceptable but the must be evaluated against adlieved 
development of both was unrealistic. actuals (i.e. Shuttle, Delta, etc.) so 
In the case of ALS, the emphasis on that the differences can be both 
the reduction of flight e'8ment understood and accounted for. If not, 
production costs did not necessarily the goal of low recurring costs will be 
equate to.reduced operations costs. projected, but are not likely to be 
Shuttle-C was envisioned to fiU the achieved. Throughout NLS concept 
gap between shutUe and ALS5 . Using development a new Space 
an unmanned cargo carrier in place of Transportation Main Engine (SlME) 
the orbiter, Shuttle-C was compatible was under development. SThE 
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concept developers recognized the 
need for product development teams 
and STME development was 
structured around this approach. 
Interaction between each of the AJT's 
helped to maintain focus of system 
capability design goals. Again the 
lack of a market and utilization goals 
was a limiting factor in concept 
development 
Access to Space was • ... a study 
responding to a Congressional 
request in the NASA FY1993 
Appropriations Act. "5. "The goals of 
the study were to identify the best 
vehides and transportation 
architectures to make major · 
reductions in the cost of space 
transportation (at least 50 per cent), 
while at the same time increasing 
safety for flight crews for the existing 
shuttle option by at least an order 
magnitude. In addition, vehicle 
reliability was to exceed 0.98 percent, 
and, as important, the robustness, 
pad time, turnaround time, and other 
aspects of operability were to be 
vastly improved. The study examined 
three major optional architectures: (1) 
retain and upgrade the Space Shuttle 
and expendable launch vehicles, (2) 
develop new vehicles using 
conventional technologies and 
transition from current vehides 
beginning in 2005, and (3) develop 
new reusable vehicles using 
advanced technologies, and transition 
from current vehicles beginning in 
2008 . ..e. Like shuttle, the advanced 
technology option operations scenario 
was built on allocated timelines and 
an assumed set of launch site 
facilities (using existing facilities to the 
greatest extent possible). The 
approach again was to support the 
vehicle design and not design for 
support. In the case of affordable 
access to space, the question is, will 
a fifty percent reduction in recurring 
costs provide a competitive 
transportation system. Even more 
important, will the access to space 
concepts stimulate market growth in 
domestic launch opportunities. 
The Reusable Launch Vehicle 
(RLV)IX-33 is.an outgrowth of Option 
3 from the Access to Space Studies. 
In the observations and conclusions 
section of the report NASA states • .. . 
an architecture featuring a new 
advanced technology single-stage-to-
orbit pure-rocket launch vehicle was 
recommended as the most attractive 
option. It has the greatest potential 
for reducing annual operations costs 
as well as life-cycle costs, it would 
develop important new technologies 
with dual-use in industry (such as 
composite vehicle structures for cars 
and airplanes), it would place the U.S 
in an extremely advantageous 
position with respect to international 
competition, and would leapfrog the 
U.S. into a next-generation launch 
capability: 5 . The Cooperative 
Agreement Notices previously 
mentioned are the . government's 
attempt to bring industry into a pro-
active role in the development of 
requirements and the direction this 
concept will take. Additionally, 
industry is being tapped to share in 
the cost of the X-33/RLV to insure 
that vehicle designs indeed meet 
established goals of reliability and 
affordable access to space in an 
international market place. 
THENEXTSTEP 
In response to the President's Space 
Transportation Policy, NASA and other 
designated government agencies have 
responded by initiating three efforts: 
In response to the challenge of single-
stage-to-orbit development, NASA 
has issued NASA Research 
Announcements (NRA's) and 
C.ooperative Agreement Notices 
(CAN's) with industry leading to the 
development of a sub-scale SSTO 
prototype known as X-33, ultimatety 
leading to industry's development and 
operation of a full-scale Rl V. 
h!ASA's Space Shuttle Program has 
advocated the use of the shuttle as a 
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flying test-bed for common 
technology demonstrations with the 
RLV. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) 
has initiated an evolutionary upgrade 
path for it's current fleet of 
expendable laund'l vehides (EL V). 
The ELV modernization program will 
play a helpful role in gaining 
experience in certain ted'lnologies 
regarding flight experience required 
prior to RLV operations. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In dosing we feel it is appropriate to 
restate the experiences from previous 
laund'l programs which led to the 
development of goals in the OST RLV 
Operations Concept Vision: 
Reduce system integrity verification 
impacts through automation. 
Simplify and reduce support 
equipment demands and functions. 
Strive for one time vehide 
certification. 
Eliminate payload impad to launch 
vehide system infrastructure and 
operations. 
Empower PT's to design 
architectureJvehide concept with a 
focus on reliability and affordability. 
Optimize annual/mass to orbit and 
single vehide utilization and not 
cost/lb. to orbit in one launch. 
Additionally, CSTS findings indicate that 
both domestic and international launch 
matkets require a system focused on 
market needs rather than one whid'l is 
designed around one user and forced to 
fit all others. The CSTS final report also 
highlighted the benefit for user's to be 
involved in up-front requirements 
development and preliminary designs. 
To reiterate, ~ ... the goal is to provide a 
system which meets all of the attributes 
of the marketarea: 4 . 
As advanced vehide concepts are 
developed, concept analysis should be 
realistically evaluated by reviewing 
candidate design concepts and asking 
the following questions: 
What has changed in this design 
concept that realistically supports 
CERprojections ? 
What reductions/functions have been 
minimized/eliminatedas a result of this 
analysis in comparison to previous 
transportation systems which support 
infrastructure simplification? 
Based on the above, will the vehicle 
meet stated design and cost 
objectives without comprom1smg 
either operability, maintainability, or 
supportability goals during system 
operation ? 
Some efforts for the RLV have started 
off using the same approach as shuttle, 
but the pre-eminent lesson learned from 
shuttle is to design for support and not 
simply support the design. If you do 
what you did before, you will get what 
you got before. 
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